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EMINENT DOMAIN - COMPENSATION - A PUBLIC CON-
DEMNEE IS ENTITLED ONLY TO THE MARKET VALUE OF A 
CONDEMNED FACILITY WHEN THE MARKET VALUE OF 
THE CONDEMNED FACILITY IS ASCERTAINABLE. United 
States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). 
In United States v. 50 Acres of Land (Duncanville), I the federal gov-
ernment condemned a 50 acre tract of land used by the City of Dun-
canville, Texas as a sanitary landfill. 2 In order to fulfill its statutory 
obligation to provide for the disposal of its garbage,3 the city purchased a 
113.7 acre site and developed it into a new landfill. 4 At trial, the city 
sought to recover the cost of developing the new site, an amount in ex-
cess of $1,276,000.00, as the proper measure of compensation for the 
condemned facility.s The government, however, contended that the 
proper measure of compensation should be determined by the con-
demned facility's fair market value.6 In response to special interrogato-
ries, the jury returned a verdict of $225,000.00 representing the fair 
market value of the condemned facility, and an alternative verdict of 
1. 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). 
2. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 529 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 706 
F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). The site was needed by the 
federal government to accommodate the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
Lakeview Lake Flood Control Project (subsequently renamed the Joe Pool Flood 
Control Project). United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1358 (5th Cir. 
1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). The federal government commenced this action 
by filing a complaint in condemnation, coupled with a declaration of taking, pursu-
ant to the Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.c. § 258a (1931). United States v. 50 
Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 453 n.3 (1984). Under that procedure, the federal 
government deposits the estimated value of the property in the registry of the court, 
whereupon title and right to possession vest immediately in the government. In 
subsequent judicial proceedings, the value of the property is determined and the 
condemnee is awarded the difference between the adjudicated value and the sum 
already received, plus interest on that difference. See id. (quoting Kirby Forest In-
dus. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2191 (1984)). Property owned by state and 
local governments is subject to the federal power of eminent domain. See Block v. 
North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 291 n.26 (1983); Oklahoma ex rei. Phillips v. Guy F. 
Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941). In relation to the federal government as 
condemnor, such property is considered to be "private property" for which just 
compensation must be paid under the fifth amendment. See Jefferson County v. 
Tennessee Valley Auth., 146 F.2d 564, 565 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 
(1945); United States v. Wheeler TP., 66 F.2d 977, 982 (8th Cir. 1933); United 
States v. Town of Nahant, 153 F. 520, 521, 523 (1st Cir. 1907). 
3. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-7 (Vernon 1982) (regulating solid waste 
disposal and sanitary landfills in Texas). 
4. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451,453 (1984). The old site had been 
used as a landfill from 1969 to 1978 and had an expected remaining life of 12.8 
years. The new site had an expected life of 41.6 years due to its larger size, superior 
soil, and superior water table conditions. Id. at 453 n.4. 
5. Id. at 453. 
6. Id. Experts for both the government and the city agreed that a market for landfill 
properties existed in the area. Based on an evaluation of the recent sale prices of 
comparable properties, the experts for the city estimated the value of the con-
demned facility as between $367,500 and $370,000; experts for the government esti-
mated its value as between $160,410 and $190,000. Id. at 453-54 n.5 (1984). 
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$723,654.01 representing the reasonable cost of a functionally equivalent 
substitute facility.1 The district court entered judgment for the lower 
amount. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the reasonable cost of a functionally equivalent sub-
stitute facility is the proper measure of compensation in the case of a 
public condemnee with a duty to replace the condemned facility.9 The 
Supreme Court reversed and held that a public condemnee is not entitled 
to compensation measured by the cost of acquiring a substitute facility 
when the market value of the condemned facility is ascertainable. 1O 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion. 11 The fundamental principle underlying the just compensation 
clause is one of indemnity: an owner of condemned property is entitled 
to be placed in as good a pecuniary position as if the property had not 
been taken. 12 Because value is an inexact, highly subjective concept, 13 
the Supreme Court has adopted the relatively objective concept of mar-
ket value at the time of takingl4 as a just and equitable guideline for 
7. Id. at 454. 
8. Id. In eminent domain proceedings, the trial court decides all issues, factual and 
legal, except the amount of compensation to be awarded. See United States v. 
Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1970); FED. R. CIv. P. 71A(h). 
9. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1360 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. 
Ct. 451 (1984). The court of appeals held that Duncanville was entitled to reim-
bursement for the reasonable cost of an alternative landfill site, the reasonable cost 
of preparing that site for use as a landfill, plus reimbursement for use of a temporary 
site in excess of the costs the city would have incurred at the original site. Id. at 
1363-64. The court of appeals, however, remanded the case for a new trial because 
the jury instructions were "inadequate to enable the jury to make a fair and com-
plete determination of the costs, including consideration of benefits received, of this 
[new landfill]." Id. at 1363; see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
10. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 453 (1984). 
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
12. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1979) (quoting Olson 
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934». 
13. According to the Supreme Court: 
The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value 
to the owner may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker. Most 
things, however, have a general demand which give them a value transfer-
able from one owner to another .... [The] loss to the owner of nontrans-
ferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic 
attachment to it. . . is properly treated as part of the burden of common 
citizenship. 
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1948). 
14. The general rule is that just compensation is determined as of the date of taking. 
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17,22-23 (1958); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 
369, 374 (1943). Accordingly, fluctuations in property values after that date, 
whether attributable to activities of the government or otherwise, are irrelevant. See 
United States v. 161.99 Acres of Land, 512 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1975). Changes in 
value before the date of taking caused by anticipation that there will be a taking also 
are not compensable. See United States v. 3.66 Acres of Land, 426 F. Supp. 533, 
535-36 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Under the "scope of the project" rule, any increase in 
value resulting from the government's demand for the property is not compensable. 
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measuring just compensation. 15 Market value has been defined as the 
price a willing buyer would pay a willing seller, with neither party under 
a compulsion to buy or sell. 16 According to the Court, the market value 
standard strikes the necessary and proper balance between the govern-
ment's need and the property owner's 10ss.17 
In its endeavor to do substantial justice in eminent domain proceed-
ings, the Court has developed objective working rules that refine the con-
cept of market value. 18 For example, the determination of market value 
is not limited solely to the condemned property's existing use, but also 
takes into consideration the highest and most profitable use for which the 
property is adaptable in the reasonably near future. 19 Furthermore, a 
condemnee is not entitled to compensation for consequential damages 
arising from the condemnation, such as reimbursement for the relocation 
costs incurred as a result of the condemnation.20 Also, the property's 
See United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1979). See 
generally Annot., 14 A.L.R. FED. 806 (1973) (discussing "scope of project" rule). 
15. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1979); United 
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1950); United States v. 
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396,402 (1949). There are 
essentially three methods of market valuation: sales approach; income approach; 
and cost approach. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 802 (2d 
Cir. 1968); Wilmington Hous. Auth. v. Greater S1. John Baptist Church, 291 A.2d 
282, 284 (Del. 1972). The sales approach assesses value by a comparison of sales of 
property with similar characteristics, and it is considered to be the most objective 
method of valuation. See United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1398, 1400 
(10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Whitehurst, 337 F.2d 765, 775 (4th Cir. 1964). 
The income approach generally is applied in valuating income producing properties. 
See 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.32[3][c] (rev. 
3d ed. 1985). The income approach capitalizes the anticipated net income from a 
property and converts this figure into an indication of market value. Id. Some 
courts allow use of the income approach as a factor in the determination of market 
value by the sales approach; other courts only allow its admission in cases in which 
comparable sales are not available. Compare In re James Madison Houses, 17 
A.D.2d 317, 320-21, 234 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803 (1962), with United States v. 49,375 
Square Feet of Land, 92 F. Supp. 384, 393 (S.D.N. Y. 1950). See also infra notes 27-
31 and accompanying text (discussing cost approach). 
16. See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470,474 
(1973); United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); 
United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). 
17. See United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 
402 (1940); see also Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1896) Gust compensation 
not to be measured from the jaundiced perspective of either the public or the 
owner). 
18. See United States v. Cors., 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949); United States v. 320.0 Acres of 
Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (1979). Congress has authorized greater relief in certain 
areas to indemnify the property owner beyond the constitutional minimum. See 
Uniform Relocation and Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 
1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1982). See generally Annot., 33 A.L.R. FED. 9 
(1977) (analyzing cases which construe and apply the act). 
19. See Searles, Highest and Best Use: The Keystone of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 
45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 39 (1973). The future use must be one that is reasonable. See 
Mills v. United States, 363 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1966). 
20. See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 204 (1979) (per curiam); United 
States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. 'Co., 339 U.S. 261, 264 (1950). 
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subjective value to its owner arising from its adaptability to a particular 
use may not be considered in the determination of just compensation.21 
That the market value standard fails to compensate for all the values 
an owner may derive from his property is justified by the need to have 
"relatively objective valuation standards" and a "workable measure of 
valuation."22 The rationale for this failure to indemnify the condemnee 
completely is that condemnation proceedings are considered to be 
against the property and not against the property owner;23 therefore, 
compensation is "for the property and not to the owner. "24 
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that in certain cir-
cumstances the application of the market value standard may deviate too 
significantly from the indemnity principle to fulfill adequately the intent 
of just compensation.25 Departure from the market value standard is 
necessary when the market value of condemned property is unascertaina-
ble, or when the application of the market value standard would result in 
"manifest injustice" to the condemnee.26 
Departure from the market value standard is appropriate where the 
condemnation involves special purpose property - property of value to 
its owner because of its peculiar characteristics or uses.27 Property of 
this unique nature is difficult to valuate by the market value standard 
because it is rarely bought or sold on the open market; therefore, the 
courts have turned to alternate methods of valuation to determine a con-
demnee's loss when such property is condemned. 28 
The courts have applied different methods of special purpose prop-
erty valuation, depending upon whether the special purpose property is 
21. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1979); Kimball 
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949). 
22. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1979). 
23. See A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149, 151 (1924); United States 
v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352-53 (1892). 
24. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). 
25. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); United 
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949). 
26. See Kirby Forests Indus. v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 n.14 (1984); United 
States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
27. See, e.g., United States v. 84.4 Acres of Land, 348 F.2d 117 (1965) (golf course); 
Redevelopment Agency v. First Christian Church, 140 Cal. App. 3d 690, 189 Cal. 
Rptr. 749 (1983) (church); Trustees at Boston Univ. v. Commonwealth, 286 Mass. 
57,190 N.E. 29 (1934) (college property). See generally Level, Evaluation o/Special 
Purpose Properties in Condemnation Proceedings, 3 URB. LAW 428 (1971) (discuss-
ing special purpose property); Note, Eminent Domain: The Problem 0/ Damages 
Where Land Has Been Adapted to a Special Use, 37 B.U. L. REV. 495 (1957) (dis-
cussing special purpose property). 
28. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 694 (2d Cir. 1965) (market 
value abandoned when nature of property produces wide discrepancy between value 
to owner and market price); Idaho-Western Ry. Co. v. Columbia Synod, 20 Idaho 
568, 572, 119 P. 60, 63-64 (1911) (market value not applicable to special purpose 
property); Rochester Urban Renewal v. Patchen Post, 45 N.Y.2d 1, 8-9, 407 
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644 (1978) (some other method of valuation necessary for special 
purpose property). 
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owned privately or pUblicly. When the government condemns privately 
owned, special purpose property, the courts generally have applied the 
"cost approach" as an approximation of market value, to determine the 
just compensation due a private condemnee.29 The cost approach entails 
four major steps: (1) estimating the reproduction costs of improve-
ments;30 (2) estimating the amount of depreciation present in the im-
provements;3! (3) deducting the total depreciation from the estimated 
reproduction costs, thereby arriving at an indication of the improve-
ments' value; and (4) adding the estimated market value of the land to 
the value of the improvements, arriving at an approximation of the prop-
erty's market value.32 Although the cost approach has been criticized as 
inherently inflationary and confusing to apply,33 it is often the only 
method available for special purpose property.34 
When the government condemns publicly owned special purpose 
property, the courts generally have applied the substitute facilities doc-
trine to determine the just compensation due a state or municipality.35 
29. See, e.g., Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Pasternostro, 236 La. 223, 226, 107 So. 2d 
451-54 (1958) (no comparable sales data available, therefore cost approach applica-
ble); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Concord Baptist Church, Inc., 257 Md. 
132, 262 A.2d 755 (1970) (cost approach required by statute when church con-
demned); Grace & Hope Mission, Inc. v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 100 
R.I. 537, 217 A.2d 476 (1966) (cost approach proper in absence of market value). 
30. Reproduction costs and replacement costs are distinct. Reproduction costs refer to 
costs of reconstructing the improvements using the same or similar materials; re-
placement costs are the costs of providing a substitute facility of equal functional 
utility. See UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1111 (1974). 
31. Estimation of the depreciation of special purpose properties has presented problems. 
Both physical and functional depreciation must be included. The functional depre-
ciation of such properties is difficult to estimate accurately because, generally, func-
tional obsolescence is measured by using market data. Thus, the estimation of 
depreciation in the case of special purpose properties depends largely upon the ap-
praiser's jUdgment. See J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
§ 12.32[3][b] (rev. 3d ed. 1985). 
32. See J. EATON, REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN LITIGATION 101 (1982). Some courts 
have allowed the use of the cost approach in the determination of market value as 
evidence of the property's highest and best use; other courts exclude consideration 
of the cost approach viewing the market approach and the cost approach as totally 
independent of one another. Compare In re Oakland Street, N.Y., 13 A.D.2d 668, 
669, 213 N.Y.S.2d 973, 975 (1961) (reproduction cost relevant to determination of 
market value) and State v. Wilson, 6 Wash. App. 443, 447, 493 P.2d 1252, 1257 
(1972) (reproduction cost relevant to determination of market value), with United 
States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F. Supp. 451, 488-90 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (reproduc-
tion cost has little bearing on market value) and Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. 
Pogzeba, 38 Colo. App. 168, 170, 558 P.2d 442, 443-44 (1976) (error to allow evi-
dence of reproduction cost in determining market value). See also UNIFORM EMI-
NENT DOMAIN CODE § IIII (1974) (reproduction cost may be used for purpose of 
providing market value). 
33. See United States v. Benning Hous. Corp., 276 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir. 1960). 
34. See 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.32[3][b] (rev. 
3d. ed. 1985). 
35. See, e.g., Caporal v. United States, 577 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1978) (compensation for 
taking of streets and alleys is cost of providing necessary substitutes); United States 
v. Streets, Alleys, & Public Ways, 531 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1976) (government must 
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The substitute facilities doctrine requires that just compensation be mea-
sured by the reasonable cost of a functionally equivalent substitute facil-
ity in order to finance a replacement of the condemned facility by the 
public condemnee.36 The doctrine is not actually a valuation technique, 
but a method of compensation that has evolved from court decisions.37 
The doctrine is based upon recognition that the loss to a community oc-
casioned by the condemnation of a public facility is not only the value of 
the property itself, but also the loss of the services previously provided by 
the condemned facility.38 Thus, a public condemnee cannot be made 
supply cost of constructing necessary substitute), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 842 (1946); 
United States v. Arkansas, 164 F.2d 943, 944 (8th Cir. 1947) (proper measure of 
damages for taking of public highways is cost of substitute). The doctrine also is 
applicable when a state condemns municipal property. See, e.g., City of Witch ita v. 
Unified School Dist. No. 259, 201 Kan. 110, 114,439 P.2d 162, 166-67 (1968) (com-
pensation is cost of providing equivalent substitute where property devoted to a 
public use by one agency of government is condemned by another agency); City of 
Tulsa v. Mingo School Dist. No. 16, 559 P.2d 487, 492-95 (Okla. App. 1976) (sub-
stitute facilities doctrine appropriate method of compensation for taking of school 
property); State Road Comm'n v. Board of Park Comm'rs, 173 S.E.2d 919, 926-27 
(W. Va. 1970) (park commissioners entitled to compensation by payment of cost of 
substitute facility). See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 143 (1971) (discussing sub-
stitute facilities doctrine). 
36. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 517 (1979) (White, J., 
concurring) ("The substitute-facilities doctrine is unrelated to fair market value. . . 
it unabashedly demands additional compensation over and above market value in 
order to allow the replacement of the condemned facility."); Town of Clarkville v. 
United States, 198 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953); 
UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § l004(b) (1974). The replacement facility 
does not have to be an exact duplicate, only a functional equivalent. See United 
States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 764 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Certain 
Lands in Red Bluff, 192 F. Supp. 725, 726-27 (N.D. Cal. 1961). A replacement may 
be furnished in kind. See Jefferson County v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 146 F.2d 564, 
566 (6th Cir. 1945). 
37. See generally State Comm'r of Transp. v. Township of S. Hackensack, 65 N.J. 377, 
381, 322 A.2d 818, 822 (1974) ("The inadequacy and incongruity of [the market 
value standard] as compensation for the taking of. . . public facilities. . . led to 
the development of the [substitute facilities] doctrine .... "). According to the 
Supreme Court: 
[The doctrine's] genesis is in language written by Chief Justice Taft in 
Brown v. United States. In Brown, three-quarters of the town of Ameri-
can Falls, Idaho, was to be inundated and destroyed by the waters of a 
reservoir on the Snake River. In that extreme situation the Chief Justice 
observed, 'a method of compensation by substitution would seem to be the 
best means of making the parties whole.' 
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 1356, 1359 (5th Cir. 1983) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 83 (1923», rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 
451 (1984). 
38. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968); City of 
Fort Worth v. United States, 188 F.2d 217, 222 (5th Cir. 1951); United States v. Des 
Moines County, 148 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 743 (1945); 
Town of Bedford v. United States, 23 F.2d 453, 454 (1st Cir. 1927). No compensa-
tion is due when reasonable alternative facilities already exist or are provided by the 
taker. United States v. Certain Lands, 246 F.2d 823, 824 (3d Cir. 1957). 
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whole, as required by the just compensation clause,39 unless sufficient 
damages are awarded to replace the condemned facility, enabling the 
public condemnee to provide anew the disrupted services to the public.40 
A public condemnee is entitled to the cost of a substitute facility, 
however, only if a replacement facility is necessary to enable the public 
condemnee to continue providing services to the community.41 Early de-
cisions limited the substitute facilities doctrine to cases in which the pub-
lic condemnee was obligated by statute to replace the condemned 
facility.42 Later decisions, recognizing that many services provided by a 
governmental body legally are not compelled, required only that the re-
placement be "in fact" necessary.43 This factual obligation rule, which 
depends upon a finding that the condemned facility is reasonably neces-
sary for the public welfare, "looks to the pragmatic needs and possibili-
ties, and not just to the technical legal minima."44 A public condemnee's 
legal or factual obligation to replace a condemned facility avoids the risk 
of a resulting windfall "if the substitute facilities were never acquired, or 
if acquired, were later sold or converted to any other use."4S 
39. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("[condemnee] must be made 
whole but is not entitled to more"). 
40. See United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965); Washington v. 
United States, 214 F.2d 33, 40 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 862 (1954). The 
substitute facilities doctrine is applicable regardless of whether it produces an award 
greater or less than the market value of the property; see United States v. Des 
Moines County, 148 F.2d 448, 449 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 743 (1945). 
41. See United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1968); United 
States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1965); Note, Just Compensation 
and the Public Condemnee, 75 YALE L.J. 1053, 1053 (1966). The determination of 
necessity is a matter for the judicial trier of fact. United States v. Streets, Alleys, & 
Public Ways, 531 F.2d 882, 886 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Los Angeles 
County, 163 F.2d 124, 125 (9th Cir. 1947). The courts have reached varied results 
applying the substitute facilities doctrine in cases in which there is no longer a pub-
lic need for the condemned property. A majority of the courts have held that the 
public condemnee sustains no loss from the taking because the obligation to replace 
a condemned facility is premised on a determination of public need; therefore, the 
public condemnee is entitled only to nominal compensation. See United States v. 
Stoutsville, 531 F.2d 882, 885-86 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. City of New 
York, 168 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1948). A minority of courts have held that a 
public condemnee is entitled to the condemned facility's market value, although 
there is no longer a public need. See United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563 
F.2d 357,359 (8th Cir. 1977); California v. United States, 395 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th 
Cir. 1968). 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 253 F.2d 760, 763 (4th Cir. 1958) (con-
demnee must be compelled legally to provide substitute property); United States v. 
Wheeler TP., 66 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1933) (town must be compelled legally to 
maintain roads); United States v. Alderson, 53 F. Supp. 528, 530-31 (S.D. W. Va. 
1944) (state must be compelled legally to provide road system). 
43. See United States v. 3,727.91 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d 357, 359 n.2 (8th Cir. 1977) 
(substitute facility must be reasonably necessary); United States v. Certain Property, 
403 F.2d 800, 803-04 (2d Cir. 1968) (public condemnee entitled to substitute facility 
if obligated to replace). 
44. United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 960, 965 (2d Cir. 1965). 
45. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1979). 
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The courts have utilized the substitute facilities doctrine primarily 
to compensate a public condemnee for the taking of streets, bridges, 
sewers, and similar nonsalable, publicly owned special purpose properties 
that have only nominal value independent of their present use.46 The 
courts, however, also have applied the doctrine to compensate for the 
taking of other public facilities regardless of whether a market value 
existed for the condemned properties.47 In the leading case of United 
States v. Certain Property (Borough of Manhattan) ,48 the United States 
condemned a public bath and recreation center owned and operated by 
the city of New York.49 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, the federal government argued that the substitute 
facilities doctrine is an exception to the market value standard to be 
applied only when the market value of a condemned facility is unascer-
tainable.50 The Second Circuit dismissed this argument, stating that a 
public condemnee obligated to replace a condemned facility is entitled to 
be awarded the cost of replacing the condemned facility, whether that 
cost is more or less than the condemned facility's actual market value. 51 
According to the court, the substitute facilities doctrine is an alternative 
method of compensation available to the public condemnee obligated to 
replace a condemned facility. 52 
Until the 1979 Supreme Court decision in United States v. 564.54 
Acres of Land (Lutheran Synod),53 there was little doubt that the substi-
tute facilities standard was the proper measure of compensation when a 
publicly owned facility was condemned. In Lutheran Synod, the Court 
examined whether compensation measured by the substitute facilities 
standard is proper when the government condemns facilities owned by a 
private nonprofit organization operating the facilities for a public pur-
pose when the market value of the condemned facilities is ascertainable. 54 
46. See, e.g., Caporal v. United States, 577 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1977) (alleyway); Town 
of Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1952) (sewer system), cert. 
denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953). 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968) (public bath 
and recreation center); United States v. Certain Land, 346 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965) 
(playground); United States v. Certain Land in Red Bluff, 192 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. 
Cal. 1961) (parking lot). But see United States v. South Dakota Game, Fish, & 
Parks Dept., 329 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1964) (allowing market value only). 
48. 403 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1968). 
49. Id. at 801. The district court held that the substitute facilities doctrine was inappli-
cable because the city, although authorized by law, was not required legally to re-
place the condemned building; consequently, compensation was based on the 
condemned building's market value. Id. at 801-02. The Second Circuit reversed, 
holding that replacement need only be reasonably necessary for the public welfare, 
and remanded "to determine whether the 'substitute facilities' doctrine should be 
applied." Id. at 804. 
50. Id. at 803. 
51. Id. 
52.Id. 
53. 441 U.S. 506 (1979). 
54. Id. at 508-09. The Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod of the Lutheran Church in 
America owned and operated several summer camps on land condemned by the 
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The Third Circuit had held that the substitute facilities doctrine was 
available as a measure of compensation to a private, nonprofit owner of 
facilities operated for a public purpose. 55 The Supreme Court rejected 
this extension of the substitute facilities doctrine, holding that a private 
owner's nonprofit status does not require a departure from the usual 
market value standard. 56 In a footnote, the Court explicitly reserved the 
issue of substitute facilities compensation as applied to public con-
demnees.57 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice White expressed 
"substantial doubt" as to the propriety of the doctrine. 58 
Consistent with its holding in Lutheran Synod, the Supreme Court 
in United States v. 50 Acres of Land (Duncanville) 59 held that the market 
value standard, when ascertainable, achieves a fair result for the public 
condemnee as well as the private owner.60 The Court dismissed the city's 
argument for substitute facility compensation based on its statutory obli-
government. Campers included underprivileged and emotionally disturbed children 
who received scholarships, as well as many campers who were not deprived finan-
cially and did not receive financial assistance. By virtue of grandfather clauses, the 
camps were allowed to operate in noncompliance with state and federal housing and 
environmental legislation, but replacement would require compliance with this leg-
islation. The church's expert witnesses estimated replacement costs to be approxi-
mately $4,361,000, whereas the jury returned a verdict of $240,000 representing the 
fair market value of the camps. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 
983, 985-86 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). 
55. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 506 F.2d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1974) (interlocu-
tory appeal). The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the facts 
of this case were appropriate for application of the substitute facilities doctrine. Id. 
On remand, the jury found that the church was not entitled to compensation deter-
mined by the substitute facilities doctrine and awarded the church the market value 
of the property. A different panel of the court of appeals reversed, finding the 
court's jury instructions in error, and ordering a new trial. United States v. 564.54 
Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983, 996 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 506 (1979). The 
Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit panel. United States v. 564.54 Acres of 
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979). The case was the subject of two casenotes, both of 
which argued that the substitute facilities doctrine was applicable. See Note, Cost of 
Substitute Facilities as a Measure of Just Compensation When There is a Private 
Condemnee, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1133 (1975); Note, Substitute Facility Measure of Just 
Compensation Is Available to Private Owners of Nonprofit Community Facilities in 
Appropriate Cases, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 711 (1975). Several state courts have 
considered the same question, reaching conflicting results. Compare Newton Girl 
Scout Council, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 355 Mass. 189, 138 N.E.2d 
769 (1956) (allowing application of substitute facilities doctrine where a Girl Scout 
camp was condemned), with State v. First Methodist Church, 6 Or. App. 492, 488 
P.2d 835 (1971) (disallowing application of substitute facilities doctrine where a 
church youth center was condemned). 
56. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1979). The Court's 
decision "was based, in part, on a fear that a private condemnee might receive a 
windfall if 'substitute facilities were never acquired, or if acquired, were later sold or 
converted to another use. '" United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 457 
(1984) (quoting United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516 (1979». 
57. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 509 n.3 (1979). 
58. Id. at 517-19 (White, J., concurring). 
59. 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). 
60. Id. at 457. 
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gation to provide for municipal garbage disposal as "no more compelling 
than the [economic] obligations assumed by private citizens."61 
In deciding this issue, the Court first addressed the differences be-
tween the public and the private condemnee. The Court found that the 
loss to a public condemnee when a public facility is condemned "may be 
no less acute" than the loss to the private owner when private property is 
condemned.62 Moreover, the Court stated that the just compensation 
clause, which refers only to compensation for "private property," does 
not require greater compensation for public condemnees than it requires 
for private condemnees.63 Accordingly, "the same principles of just 
compensation presumptively apply to both private and public 
condemnees. "64 
The Court next addressed the risk of a windfall to the public con-
demnee under the substitute facilities doctrine. The Court stated that the 
city's legal obligation to replace the condemned landfill would not avoid 
the risk of a windfa1l65 because the city necessarily would experience a 
windfall under the substitute facilities doctrine by receiving funds for a 
more costly, presumably more valuable facility.66 Furthermore, the 
Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's finding that the risk of a windfall could 
be reduced by discounting the award to account for the superior quality 
of the new facility.67 The Court reasoned that discounting was simply a 
more complex and speculative method of arriving at the market value of 
a condemned facility.68 
61. [d. 
62. [d. at 456. 
63. [d. at 455; see also supra note 2 (state and municipal property subject to the federal 
power of eminent domain). 
64. [d. 
65. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
66. 105 S. Ct. at 457. According to the Court, "any increase in the quality of the facility 
may be as readily characterized as a 'windfall' as the award of cash proceeds for a 
substitute facility that is never built." [d. 
67. [d. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court's instruction regarding the substi-
tute facilities standard was "inadequate to enable the jury to make a fair and com-
plete determination of the costs, including consideration of the benefits received, of 
this particular substitute facility." United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 706 F.2d 
1356, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984); see 
also United States v. Certain Property, 403 F.2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1968) ("equitable 
principles undergirding just compensation require that the substitution cost be dis-
counted by reason of the benefit which accrues to the condemnee when a new build-
ing replaces one with expired useful years"). 
68. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 457-58 (1984). According to the 
Court, under this approach, the jury would have to make at least two 
determinations: 
[d. 
(i) the reasonable (rather than actual) replacement cost, which would re-
quire an inquiry into the fair market value of the second facility; and (ii) 
the extent to which the new facility is superior to the old, which would 
require an analysis of the qualitative differences between the new and the 
old. It would also be necessary to determine the fair market value of the 
old property in order to provide a basis for comparison. 
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Finally, the Court addressed the need to measure just compensation 
by objective standards that disregard the condemned property's subjec-
tive value to its owner.69 The Court stated that the "open-ended charac-
ter of the substitute facilities doctrine" increases the possibility of a 
windfall to the public condemnee because the "condemnation contest is 
between the local community and a national government that may be 
thought to have unlimited resources. "70 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that a public con-
demnee obligated to replace a condemned facility should not be limited 
to compensation determined by the market value when the public con-
demnee can prove that the market value standard in a particular case 
would be manifestly unjust.7 1 According to Justice O'Connor, the mar-
ket value standard would be manifestly unjust when "the market value 
... deviates significantly from the make-whole remedy intended by the 
Just Compensation Clause. . . ."72 
The substitute facilities doctrine requires compensation greater than 
market value to enable the public condemnee to replace the condemned 
facility.?3 Historically, however, deviation from the market value stan-
dard was necessary only in two circumstances, neither of which were 
present in Duncanville: (1) when market value was unascertainable; or 
(2) when the market value standard would result in "manifest injus-
tice."74 The Court has stated repeatedly that private property's subjec-
tive value to its owner is not compensable; 75 accordingly, a public 
facility's value in terms of its worth to the community should not be 
considered when determining the just compensation owed a public con-
demnee. Because compensation is "for the property and not to the 
owner,"76 the obligation of the public condemnee to replace the con-
demned facility does not necessitate a departure from the market value 
standard when the market value is ascertainable. 
Duncanville leaves a couple of questions unanswered. The majority 
expressed no view concerning the availability of the substitute facilities 
doctrine in circumstances where application of the market value stan-
dard would be "manifestly unjust." The concurring opinion stated that 
the substitute facilities standard should be available to the public con-
demnee when the condemned facility's market value "deviates signifi-
69. Id. at 458; see supra text accompanying notes 18-21 and accompanying text. 
70. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 458 (1984). The Court, however, 
stated that "we express no view. . . on reproduction costs ... when offered on the 
issue of fair market value." Id. at n.24. 
71. Id. at 459 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying note 26. 
72. United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 105 S. Ct. 451, 459 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
73. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1979) (White, J., 
concurring); United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 529 F. Supp. 220, 222-23 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981), rev'd, 706 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 451 (1984). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 
75. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing sUbjective value). 
76. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24. 
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candy from the make-whole remedy" intended by the fifth amendment, 77 
but the opinion did not indicate when a deviation would be significant 
enough to necessitate a departure from the market value standard. The 
Court's preference for market value as an objective and workable mea-
sure of value,78 however, indicates that when market value is ascertain-
able this exception to the market value standard rarely will be applied. 
The availability of the substitute facilities doctrine when the market 
value of a condemned facility- is unascertainable also is unclear. 
However, in light of the Court's rejection in Duncanville of the public 
condemnee's obligation to replace a condemned facility as a relevant fac-
tor in the determination of just compensation,79 the viability of the sub-
stitute facilities doctrine, even when the market value is unascertainable, 
is doubtful. According to Duncanville, the government should be re-
quired to compensate the public condemnee only for the value of the 
property taken, not for the loss of services previously provided by the 
condemned facility. The courts apply the cost approach to determine 
compensation when privately owned, special purpose property is con-
demned. 80 Hence, the cost approach also should be applied when pub-
licly owned, special purpose property is condemned.8) 
Despite these unanswered questions, the limitation of the substitute 
facilities doctrine in Duncanville is a logical application of just compensa-
tion principles. The inequity of the failure to fully indemnify the public 
condemnee for its loss, thereby forcing it to expend public funds to re-
place the condemned facility, must be viewed in light of the well-estab-
lished treatment of private owners. Duncanville simply places the public 
condemnee in the same position as the private owner in the context of the 
just compensation clause of the fifth amendment. 
Steven M Sind/er 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
78. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61. 
80. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
81. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
